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Abstract
Why are some institutional designs perceived as more legitimate than others, and why is the same
institutional design sometimes perceived as legitimacy-enhancing in one setting and not in another?
In a world in which most international organisations (IOs) do not fully embody societal values
and norms, such as democratic participation and equal treatment, why do legitimacy deﬁcits in
some organisations lead to pressure for institutional change while in others they are tolerated?
These are important questions given that many analysts have diagnosed a ‘legitimacy crisis’
of IOs, but we argue that existing approaches are ill equipped to answer them. We show that
the existing legitimacy literature has an implicit model of institutional change – the congruence
model – but that this model has difﬁculty accounting for important patterns of change and
non-change because it lacks microfoundations. We argue that attributions of legitimacy rest on per-
ceptions and this implies the need to investigate the cognitive bases of legitimacy. We introduce a
cognitive model of legitimacy and deduce a set of testable propositions to explain the conditions under
which legitimacy judgments change and, in turn, produce pressures for institutional change in IOs.
Keywords
Legitimacy; Cognitive Models; International Organisations; Institutional Change; Legitimation
Introduction
Institutionalist scholarship has recently begun to investigate the ways in which perceived legitimacy
deﬁcits of international organisations (IOs) create pressures for institutional reform. At the global
level, the legitimacy of post-Second World War global multilateral organisations, such as the
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations, is being
challenged for being unrepresentative of the voices, interests, and values of developing countries and
their citizens. At the regional level, the legitimacy of the European Union has been perceived as
declining over the last two decades and is currently in what some are calling a legitimacy crisis. This
perceived legitimacy crisis of IOs has led to a lively policy and academic debate over the types of
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institutional reforms that might remedy the deﬁcit and enhance legitimacy.1 Indeed, IO legitimacy
has received renewed attention as an important variable in explaining institutional change, a central
concern of recent institutionalist literature.2
Beyond the core insight that legitimacy can be a source of institutional change, however, we still
know little about the conditions under which an IO is likely to suffer a perceived legitimacy deﬁcit,
when that legitimacy deﬁcit is likely to lead to institutional change, and what type of institutional
change we are likely to observe as a result. Consider, for example, that while the creation of
parliamentary bodies has been a notable response to legitimacy concerns within regional IOs, there
has been little movement to implement them at the global level,3 despite a vast theoretical literature
discussing the beneﬁts of instituting global parliamentary assemblies.4 Many proposals to enhance
democratic legitimacy of global IOs envisage state-based elections for global parliamentarians in a
way not dissimilar to the process in the European Union,5 but proposals to create a parliamentary
body within the United Nations in order to remedy its legitimacy deﬁcits are often seen as radical
rather than legitimacy-enhancing. Why are some institutional designs perceived as more legitimate
than others, and why is the same institutional design sometimes perceived as legitimacy-enhancing in
one setting and not in another? Moreover, in a world in which most IOs do not fully embody
underlying societal values and norms, such as democratic participation and equal treatment, why do
legitimacy deﬁcits in some organisations lead to pressure for change while in others they are simply
tolerated? What factors condition actor sensitivity to legitimacy deﬁcits? These are important
questions at a time when the post-Second World War liberal international order is increasingly
challenged on legitimacy grounds.6
1 Michael Barnett, ‘Bringing in the new world order: Liberalism, legitimacy, and the United Nations’, World
Politics, 49:4 (1997), pp. 526–51; Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deﬁcit in the
EU: Responses to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44:3 (2006), pp. 533–62;
Alexandru Grigorescu, Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations? Normative Pressures and Decision-
Making Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Miles Kahler, ‘Deﬁning accountability up: the
global economic multilaterals’, Government and Opposition, 39:2 (2004), pp. 132–58; Joseph E. Stiglitz,
‘Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and accountability’,
Governance, 16:1 (2003), pp. 111–39.
2 On the literature’s recent focus on institutional change, see Thomas Rixen and Lora Anne Viola, ‘Historical
institutionalism and International Relations: Towards explaining change and stability in international insti-
tutions’, in Thomas Rixen, Lora Viola, and Michael Zürn (eds), Historical Institutionalism and International
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 3–36.
3 Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks, ‘Patterns of international organization:
General purpose vs. task speciﬁc’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 49 (2015), pp. 131–56.
4 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi, ‘Principles of cosmopolitan democracy’, in Daniele Archibugi,
David Held, and Martin Köhler (eds), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198–228; Danielle Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of
Citizens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy, For and Against:
Ethical Theory, Institutional Design, and Social Struggles (London: Routledge, 2008); Luis Cabrera, Political
Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State (New York: Routledge, 2004).
5 See the systematic proposal of Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the creation of a Global People’s
Assembly: Legitimacy and the power of popular sovereignty’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 36:2
(2000), pp. 191–220; Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘Toward global parliament’, Foreign Affairs, 80:1
(2001), pp. 212–20.
6 For a recent treatment of this development, see Larry Diamond, Mark F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker
(eds), Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2016).
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We argue that in order to begin to answer these questions, we need to take into account the cognitive
processes that shape legitimacy perceptions in the ﬁrst place. Our purpose in this article is to use insights
from the cognitive psychology literature to develop a cognitive approach to explain how legitimacy
perceptions shape pressures for institutional change. The ﬁeld of cognitive psychology has studied
judgment formation for more than four decades and the resulting body of empirical ﬁndings has been
applied to different settings of political decision-making.7 However, the relevance of these ﬁndings for
understanding organisational legitimacy thus far has not been systematically explored. We develop a
cognitive account of organisational legitimacy and spell out some of its observable implications for
institutional (non-)change. These implications, we posit, are distinct from implicit expectations within the
existing legitimacy literature. Existing arguments about the consequences of legitimacy for institutional
change, we argue, are underspeciﬁed and indeterminate in the absence of microfoundations that help
explain how legitimacy judgments are formed. Existing approaches have difﬁculty explaining a range of
complex cases, such as when an organisation is not under pressure to change even though we might
expect it to suffer from low legitimacy, or cases in which an IO faces legitimacy pressures suddenly even
though neither its design nor the values of its constituents have changed.
We take as our point of departure the insight that legitimacy concerns can be an important driver of
institutional change. Indeed, we show that the organisational legitimacy literature has a particular
model of institutional change – what we call the congruence model – implicitly embedded within it
(Section I). According to this model, incongruence between societal values and an organisation’s
procedures, purpose, and performance will lead to a loss of legitimacy and, consequently, to pres-
sures for institutional change. But this account, we argue, is too coarse; it fails to appreciate the
perceptual, and therefore cognitive, nature of legitimacy judgments. In order to better capture the
dynamics of organisational legitimacy, it is necessary to provide legitimacy judgments with micro-
foundations (Section II). From these cognitive microfoundations, then, we can develop propositions
about the conditions under which an incongruence between societal values and organisational
features is likely to lead to legitimacy loss, and the conditions under which legitimacy loss is likely to
lead to institutional change (Section III).
I. Legitimacy as an explanation of institutional change
What explains change in institutional design both within IOs and across IOs over time? This
question has become a central concern of recent institutionalist literature in International Relations
(IR). Traditionally, the IR literature has identiﬁed three broad logics that explain the creation of and
adherence to institutional equilibria: the distribution of power, the pursuit of self-interest, and the
normative appropriateness of the organisation. This tripartite distinction maps different expectations
about what drives actor compliance and institutional change; such as, changes in power (for
example, hegemonic decline), utility loss, or legitimacy loss. While we do not deny the importance of
power and interests, we aim to contribute to recent literature that focuses on the normative
7 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976); Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, ‘The Rubicon theory of war’, International Security, 36:1
(2011), pp. 7–40; Jack Levy, ‘Psychology and foreign policy decision-making’, in Leonie Huddy, David O.
Sears, and Jack Levy (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), pp. 301–33; Lauge Poulsen, ‘Bounded rationality and the diffusion of modern investment trea-
ties’, International Studies Quarterly, 58:1 (2014), pp. 1–14; Kurt Weyland, ‘Theories of policy diffusion:
Lessons from Latin American pension reform’, World Politics, 57:2 (2005), pp. 262–95; Kurt Weyland,
Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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appropriateness, or legitimacy, of an IO for understanding support and demands for institutional
reforms.8
Legitimacy is recognised as important to organisations because it helps to explain institutional
choices and actor compliance even in a setting, such as the international system often is, in which
coercive enforcement mechanisms are absent and the potential for utility losses are real.9 In other
words, legitimacy is the answer to Thomas Franck’s seminal question: ‘Why should rules, unsup-
ported by an effective structure of coercion comparable to a national police force, nevertheless elicit
so much compliance, even against perceived self-interest, on the part of sovereign states?’10 The
literature on organisational legitimacy is premised on the idea that institutions are selected and
supported based on voluntary recognition of the organisation’s ‘right to rule’; legitimacy involves a
moral obligation.11 This idea is nicely captured in Richard Merelman’s deﬁnition of legitimacy as
‘the quality of “oughtness” that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime’.12
According to this logic, institutional change should be motivated not only by changes in the
distribution of power or utility losses but also by changes in organisational legitimacy.
But how, speciﬁcally, does legitimacy lead to institutional change? Thus far the legitimacy literature in IR
has focused on normative considerations, such as determining what the appropriate standards of
legitimacy ought to be,13 or on sociological considerations, such as empirically studying whether and on
what grounds actors actually accept an IO as legitimate,14 but has not explicitly developed a theory of
8 The three logics of change – power, interests, and appropriateness – need not be mutually exclusive. Power and
efﬁciency are often combined as motivations that explain institutional design and institutional change.
Legitimacy and efﬁciency are also often seen as mutually reinforcing; indeed, the premise of the legitimacy
literature is that no institution can be effective without legitimacy. Power and legitimacy, in turn, are both
necessary components of authority. Conceptually, however, these three motivations for institutional design
and change are distinct and they operate through different logics.
9 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The force of prescriptions’, International Organization, 38:4 (1984), pp. 685–708;
Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’, International Organization, 53:2 (1999),
pp. 379–408; Barnett, ‘Bringing in the new world order’, p. 544.
10 Thomas Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the international system’, American Journal of International Law, 82:4 (1988),
pp. 705–59 (p. 707).
11 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 6; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane,
‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, Ethics and International Affairs, 20:4 (2006), pp. 405–37
(pp. 408–10).
12 Richard Merelman, ‘Learning and legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, 60:3 (1966), pp. 548–61
(p. 548).
13 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Fritz
W. Scharpf, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung [Democracy Theory between Utopia and
Assimilation] (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1970); Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and
Raffaele Marchetti (eds), Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 5; Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane,
‘Accountability and abuses of power in world politics’, American Political Science Review, 99:1 (2005),
pp. 29–43; Jürgen Neyer, The Justiﬁcation of Europe: A Political Theory of Supranational Integration
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
14 Lisa Dellmuth, ‘The knowledge gap in world politics: Assessing the sources of citizen awareness of the United
Nations Security Council’, Review of International Studies, 42:4 (2016), pp. 673–700; Lisa Dellmuth and Jonas
Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, institutional performance,
and conﬁdence extrapolation in the United Nations’, Review of International Studies, 41:3 (2015), pp. 451–75;
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legitimacy-driven institutional change.15 Nevertheless, we argue that the existing legitimacy literature is
based on an implicit model of change that we refer to as the ‘congruence model’ (Figure 1). This model
starts from the premise that legitimacy is derived from congruence between an organisation’s features and
the social values and norms held by actors in the organisation’s constituency. In a seminal text on
legitimacy, David Beetham points towards the moral justiﬁability of political institutions and systems of
power as a major determinant of legitimacy, which involves ‘an assessment of the degree of congruence, or
lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its
justiﬁcation’.16 Mark Suchman deﬁnes legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and deﬁnitions’.17 In other words, legitimacy ‘reﬂects a congruence between the behaviors of
the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group’.18 This is also a
dominant view in IR where Ian Hurd, among others, sees legitimacy to be ‘a subjective quality, relational
between actor and institution, and deﬁned by the actor’s perception of the institution’.19
Despite different analytical foci, the bulk of the literature follows Beetham in the view that orga-
nisational legitimacy depends on the congruence between an organisation’s features – speciﬁcally, its
procedures, purpose, and performance20 – on the one hand, and the inter-subjectively shared norms
and values held by relevant organisational stakeholders, on the other hand. If correspondence exists,
organisational legitimacy results; as correspondence declines, so does organisational legitimacy.
Because legitimacy enables organisations to function in the absence of threats of coercion and in the
presence of potential utility losses, policymakers are sensitive to a decline in an organisation’s
legitimacy, or legitimacy loss. Legitimacy loss leads to reduced support for the organisation and,
consequently, pressure to engage in institutional changes that re-establish congruence. This, we
argue, is the change mechanism implicit within the legitimacy literature.
According to this model, incongruence can arise in two ways: a change in the organisational features
(procedures, purpose, performance) against a ﬁxed set of underlying norms and values; or a change in
Hans Agné, Lisa Dellmuth, and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Does stakeholder involvement foster democratic legitimacy in
international organizations? An empirical assessment of a normative theory’, Review of International Organiza-
tions, 10:4 (2015), pp. 465–88; Martin Binder and Monika Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council:
Evidence from recent General Assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59:2 (2015), pp. 238–50.
15 But see Bruce Gilley, ‘Legitimacy and institutional change: the case of China’, Comparative Political Studies,
41:3 (2008), pp. 259–84.
16 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1991), p. 11.
17 Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches’, Academy of Management
Review, 20:3 (1995), pp. 571–610 (p. 574).
18 Ibid., p. 574.
19 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’, p. 381; see also Barnett, ‘Bringing in the new world
order’, p. 542 and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, International Politics, 44:2 (2007),
pp. 157–74 (pp. 162–3).
20 Much of the debate has centered on which one of these features mainly determines legitimacy judgments, but
there is widespread consensus that all three are relevant. See, inter alia, Fritz W. Scharpf,Governing in Europe:
Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The legitimacy
of global governance institutions’, p. 409; Jonathan G. S. Koppell, World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy,
and the Design of Global Governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Michael Zürn and
Matthew Stephen, ‘The view of old and new powers on the legitimacy of international institutions’, Politics,
30:S1 (2010), pp. 91–101; John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, ‘Organizational legitimacy: Social values and
organizational behaviour’, Paciﬁc Sociological Review, 18:1 (1975), pp. 122–36; Barnett, ‘Bringing in the new
world order’, p. 539.
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the underlying standard of appropriateness against given organisational procedures, goals, and
performance. In the ﬁrst type of incongruence sequence, organisational features (perhaps ones created
on efﬁciency grounds) violate underlying normative principles and thereby cause a decline in organi-
sational legitimacy, which actors seek to mitigate through additional institutional change. This is a
dynamic that has regularly driven institutional reform in the European Union.21 The Lisbon Treaty, for
example, was in part meant to reduce the Union’s legitimacy deﬁcit that resulted from the incongruence
of its procedures with underlying democratic norms, which had accumulated over prior waves
of efﬁciency-driven institutional reform. Normative standards based on democratic principles had,
arguably, not changed, but the IO’s procedures needed to be updated to match these standards. Another
example is the expansion of the United Nations’mandate to include the Responsibility to Protect. Much
recent criticism sees this emergent rule as contravening key underlying principles, such as
non-intervention and sovereign autonomy, and thus undermining organisational legitimacy and
spurring institutional reform efforts.22 Others have argued that as IOs expand their policy reach to
‘beyond the border’ issues that include individuals as the targets of regulation, they are under increased
pressure to reform their procedures to align with standard norms of democratic participation.23
The second type of incongruence occurs when changes in underlying standards of appropriateness no
longer match dominant organisational features, leading to pressures for institutional change to
conform to the new normative standards of appropriateness. Christian Reus-Smit argues, for
example, that changes in basic institutional forms of international society reﬂect shifts in prevailing
beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organising principle of sovereignty, and the norm of
procedural justice.24 Modern multilateralism, for example, was legitimised by a normative shift
Organisational
Features
(Procedures, Purpose,
Performance) 
Social Standards of 
Appropriateness
Degree of Congruence Degree of Legitimacy Pressures forInstitutional Change
Figure 1. The congruence model of organisational legitimacy.
21 Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
22 Jennifer Welsh, ‘Norm contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 5:4
(2013), pp. 365–96. On legitimacy in the United Nations Security Council, see Jennifer Welsh and Dominik
Zaum, ‘Legitimation and the UN Security Council’, in Dominik Zaum (ed.), Legitimating International
Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 65–87.
23 Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International authority and its politicization’,
International Theory, 4:1 (2012), pp. 69–106. This critique is also often levied at ﬁnancial institutions, such as the
G20. See Lora Anne Viola, ‘The G-20 and global ﬁnancial regulation’, in Manuela Moschella and Catherine
Weaver (eds), Handbook of Global Economic Governance (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 121–6.
24 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
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away from a social order based on natural law to a contractarian view of individual rights that
understood the purpose of the state as a guarantor of those rights. More recently, Alexandru
Grigorescu has shown how the rise of democratic norms and principles has created normative
pressures for existing institutional designs – rules of participation, voting procedures, and
transparency – to adapt in order to better align with those emergent norms.25 Jonas Tallberg and
colleagues have shown how IOs have opened up to civil society actors partly in response to changes
in understandings of democratic participation norms.26
The congruence model provides a useful starting point for thinking about organisational legitimacy
and its relation to institutional change. It offers an analytically distinct and empirically plausible
mechanism of change that is rooted in a variety of intellectual traditions and feeds off work in
different social science disciplines. Yet, this implicit model of legitimacy as a driver of institutional
change is underspeciﬁed, giving rise to three explanatory weaknesses. These weaknesses derive
from the tendency to treat legitimacy as resulting from the straightforward assessment of
congruence, by which a match or mismatch between institution and norms can be objectively
ascertained.27 In this view, changes in congruence are taken at face value as information that
translates smoothly into judgments about organisational legitimacy. As we argue below, this account
fails to take seriously the insight that attributions of legitimacy rest on perceptions; that is, that
assessments of congruence lead to legitimacy judgments by way of cognitive processing. In short, the
microfoundations that the model implies have yet to be developed. The costs of this failure are
threefold.
The ﬁrst weakness of the congruence model is that it has difﬁculty to account for endogenous
dynamics of legitimacy judgments and legitimacy-driven institutional change. Change in the
congruence model is exogenous: it expects organisational legitimacy to be constant as long as
congruence between organisational features and underlying standards of appropriateness persists;
conversely, it expects legitimacy judgments to change as soon as incongruence develops. It appears
empirically plausible, however, that legitimacy may deepen or erode (that is, become more or less
robust to external shocks) over time even in the presence of unchanged congruence. The German
Grundgesetz, for example, is arguably more legitimate today than it was in the 1950s because over
time Germans have more deeply internalised that it serves as an important safeguard of democratic
norms and that it should be obeyed. As many observers suggest, Germans have been successfully
‘educated to democracy’.28 For related reasons, an IO may be able to retain high levels of legitimacy
even if its features become incongruent with underlying norms. One could argue, for example, that
the United Nations has experienced a surprisingly small change in legitimacy given the degree of
incongruence between its organisational features and underlying norms because over time it has built
up a store of legitimacy. As Michael Barnett notes, ‘the UN is still the cathedral of the international
25 Grigorescu, Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations?
26 Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jönsson, The Opening up of International
Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013);
see also Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito, ‘Democratic memberships in international
organizations: Sources of institutional design’, Review of International Organizations, 11:1 (2016), pp. 59–87.
27 For a different critique of the concept of legitimacy that points towards the multiplicity and diversity of
motivational mechanisms underlying legitimate orders, see Xavier Marquez, ‘The irrelevance of legitimacy’,
Political Studies, 64:S1 (2016), pp. 19–34.
28 Beate Rosenzweig, Erziehung zur Demokratie? Amerikanische Besatzungs- und Schulreformpolitik in
Deutschland und Japan [Schooling Democracy? United States Policies of Occupation and School Reform in
Germany and Japan] (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1998).
Legitimacy and institutional change in international organisations
945
community, the organizational repository of the community’s collective beliefs’.29 In other words,
congruence does not necessarily imply invariance in organisational legitimacy because legitimacy
change may have endogenous sources, while incongruence may not immediately lead to legitimacy
loss because legitimacy may exhibit path dependent qualities.
Second, the congruence model has difﬁculty accounting for spatial dynamics of legitimacy judgments
and legitimacy-driven institutional change because it neglects legitimacy dynamics in other, related
IOs. It assumes that all that matters for assessing the legitimacy of an organisation is to know
the organisation’s procedures, purpose, or performance as well as the relevant standard of
appropriateness. On this basis, individuals ﬁgure out a normative ideal point and compare the
existing IO to it. If the two match up, the organisation is seen as legitimate; if the two do not match
up, the organisation is seen as less or even illegitimate. This process of legitimacy judgment implies
that IOs are conceived as atomistic entities whose legitimacy is determined in isolation from that of
other, related organisations. Again, this appears empirically questionable. For example, we can
discern waves of legitimacy crises that envelop groups of IOs. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that
sparked a legitimacy crisis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, was the start of
broader anti-globalisation protests felt across related global economic IOs and culminating in 2000,
the ‘year of global protest’. The legitimacy crisis of the IMF was followed in 1999 by protests in
Seattle at the World Trade Organization ministerial meeting. The collapse of the ministerial meeting,
in turn, encouraged massive protests at subsequent World Bank-IMF meetings and the annual Asian
Development Bank conference in the spring and autumn of 2000.30 Similarly, after the end of the
Cold War, regional organisations across diverse contexts have created parliamentary bodies as
legitimation devices, suggesting cross-cutting inﬂuences.31 These examples suggest that legitimacy
challenges in one organisation might have repercussions for the legitimacy of other, related orga-
nisations. In other words, legitimacy dynamics are not independent across different organisations,
but are in fact interdependent.
A third weakness of the congruence model is that it is indeterminate with respect to the speciﬁc
institutional choices that are likely to result from a decline in legitimacy. While the congruence model
broadly posits that legitimacy requires some overlap between societal norms and organisational
features, it is largely indeterminate with respect to what levels of congruence lead to what levels of
legitimacy and, therefore, with respect to what kinds of institutional change will be legitimacy
enhancing. Congruence is multiply realisable; multiple institutional designs can be compatible with
the same underlying norms. We would not expect, however, all variations of congruence to be
equally legitimate. Many institutional designs, for instance, can be congruent with democratic norms
and principles, but not all of these variants will necessarily enjoy legitimacy. Multilateralism, as
Reus-Smit suggests, may be legitimate because it is congruent with underlying constitutive norms,
but multilateralism comes in many institutional guises with varying levels of legitimacy – witness the
variation in legitimacy across post-Second World War IOs despite their common commitment to
multilateralism.32 Moreover, scholars of normative legitimacy make proposals for appropriate
29 Barnett, ‘Bringing in the new world order’, p. 541.
30 James Rosenau, David Earnest, Yale Ferguson, and Ole R. Holsti, On the Cutting Edge of Globalization
(Maryland: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2006), p. 125.
31 Jofre Rocabert, Frank Schimmelfennig, Thomas Winzen, and Loriana Crasnic, ‘The Rise of International
Parliamentary Institutions: Authority and Legitimation’ (Manuscript, ETH Zurich, 2016).
32 For one explanation of this variation, see Tana Johnson, ‘Guilt by association: the link between states’
inﬂuence and legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 6:1
(2011), pp. 57–84.
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organisational procedures, purposes, and performance that improve congruence with social norms,
but not all of these proposals enjoy empirical legitimacy – recall the example of global parliamentary
assemblies discussed earlier. Indeed, the empirical world seems to indicate that there are important
threshold effects at work that determine when incongruence leads to legitimacy loss, but the model
does not theorise why such threshold effects should matter or what determines them.
These empirical and analytical weaknesses indicate that the existing congruence model of legitimacy
is insufﬁcient for understanding the formation of legitimacy judgments and, consequently, pressures
for institutional change. Some congruence between underlying norms and organisational features
appears to be part of the very deﬁnition of legitimacy; however, variation in the level of congruence
between an IO’s features and underlying social norms cannot on its own explain variation in
legitimacy judgments. We argue that the evaluative assessment of congruence – that is, the meaning
of congruence for legitimacy – is ultimately a perceptual judgment that requires examining its
cognitive microfoundations. Cognitive factors are signiﬁcant because they mediate how sensitive or
tolerant actors are to varying degrees of incongruence. Examining cognitive microfoundations can
help us to understand why, for instance, an incongruent but familiar IO may still be perceived as
more legitimate than the congruence model alone would predict. In the next section we introduce a
cognitive model of legitimacy that seeks to understand how cognitive processes affect legitimacy
judgments and what implications this has for when imperfect congruence between organisational
features and underlying norms will actually produce a push for institutional change.
II. The cognitive foundations of legitimacy
The dominant deﬁnition of legitimacy, as we have outlined it above, explicitly but only incidentally
depends on actor perceptions. Recall that for Hurd, legitimacy is ‘deﬁned by the actor’s perception of
the institution’,33 for Suchman legitimacy is ‘a generalized perception’,34 and Jonathon Symons
characterises legitimacy as ‘a “latent” psychological variable’.35 Many important deﬁnitions of
legitimacy, then, imply a cognitive process that has yet to be spelled out. While the literature has thus
far emphasised the correspondence element of the deﬁnition, it has given less attention to the per-
ceptual element of legitimacy. At the same time, while cognitive explanations have been used broadly
to account for institutional or policy change,36 their implications for perceptions of legitimacy have
yet to be developed. We draw on the literature in cognitive psychology to develop microfoundations
for the congruence model. Lessons from the cognitive literature are likely to help us better under-
stand under what conditions (non-)changes to organisational features or underlying norms are likely
to result in changes to legitimacy and when that is likely to lead to pressures for institutional change.
In this section, we discuss three core insights from the cognitive literature that should inform the way we
think about legitimacy judgments: (1) judgments rely on cognitive schemata and heuristics that bias
33 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’, p. 381, emphasis in original.
34 Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy’, p. 574.
35 Jonathan Symons, ‘The legitimation of international organizations: Examining the identity of the communities
that grant legitimacy’, Review of International Studies, 37:5 (2011), pp. 2557–83 (p. 2559).
36 In IR see, for example, Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview,
1980); Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War:
Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1969 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992); Levy, ‘Psychology and foreign policy decision-making’; Weyland, ‘Theories of policy diffusion’;
Weyland, Making Waves. On cognitive models of institutional change, see Kurt Weyland, ‘Toward a new
theory of institutional change’, World Politics, 60:2 (2008), pp. 281–314.
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judgment; (2) they are comparative; and (3) they are sticky, up to a threshold. These lessons from
cognitive decision-making theory provide empirically veriﬁed microfoundations for legitimacy judgments
that lead to expectations different from the implicit or explicit implications of the standard congruence
model. In Section III, we then scale up these lessons to develop distinctive hypotheses about aggregate
patterns of organisational legitimacy and implications for institutional change. The expanded ‘cognitive
congruence model’, which we now introduce, is depicted in Figure 2.
Legitimacy judgments are rooted in cognitive schemata and heuristics
Because the bulk of the literature on legitimacy does not consider complex cognitive processes, most
work implicitly expects actors to form legitimacy judgments in an ‘empty’ mind (tabula rasa): actors
collect information on relevant organisational characteristics and accurately assess the congruence of
characteristics and underlying standards of appropriate rule. The baseline assumption is that no other
information apart from that derived from the organisation in question is used in judgment, and that
congruence can be assessed unambiguously on the basis of this information without reliance on mental
structures to give meaning to facts. Susan Fiske has termed this type of information processing ‘piecemeal
processing’, which she characterises as relying ‘only on the information given and combines the available
features without reference to an overall organizing structure’.37
In cognitive psychology, in contrast, it has become widely accepted that actors are generally
‘cognitive misers’ and perception, judgment, and other basic cognitive tasks rely on schemata or mental
concepts based on experiences that guide information collection, processing, and judgment.38 In this
approach, information is both incomplete and complex and therefore meaningful only through
cognitive processes that mediate the perception and processing of external stimuli.39 Unlike piecemeal
Organisational
Features
(Procedures, Purpose,
Performance) 
Social Standards of
Appropriateness
Degree of Congruence Pressures forInstitutional Change
Perception
Use of
cognitive
schemata
and
heuristics
Legitimacy Judgments
Comparative
Sticky (up to a threshold)
Figure 2. The cognitive model of organisational legitimacy.
37 Susan Fiske, ‘Schema-based versus piecemeal politics: a patchwork quilt, but not a blanket, of evidence’, in
Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears (eds), Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on
Cognition (Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1986), pp. 41–53 (p. 43).
38 Joseph W. Alba and Lynn Hasher ‘Is memory schematic?’, Psychological Bulletin, 93:2 (1983), pp. 203–31; Susan
Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture (2nd edn, Los Angeles; London: Sage, 2013),
ch. 4; Herbert A. Simon,Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: JohnWiley and Sons, 1957). Akin to our
criticism of the congruence model of legitimacy, schema theory developed in response to associationist theories,
‘which posited mental representations that directly reﬂected the external world’. See Ronald W. Casson, ‘Schemata
in cognitive anthropology’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 12 (1983), pp. 429–62 (p. 430).
39 Roy G. D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (Harvard:
Harvard University Press, 1997); Daniel Kahneman, ‘A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping
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processing, in schematic processing each ‘new person, event, or issue is treated as an instance of an
already familiar category or schema’.40 Schemata are ‘knowledge structures that represent objects or
events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under
conditions of incomplete information’.41 As Richard Nisbet and Lee Ross put it, ‘Objects and events in
the phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they were sui generis conﬁgurations but rather
are assimilated into preexisting structures in the mind of the perceiver.’42
This perspective suggests that we should approach legitimacy judgments not simply as the result of
actually collected information but as that information ﬁltered through existing experiences and ways
of perceiving similar situations.43 The informational requirements for legitimacy judgments are
demanding, and the information needed to render them is likely to be ambiguous. For example, it is
far from obvious what the appropriate standard for assessing an IO is and what, speciﬁcally, this
standard requires of an IO in terms of procedures, purpose, or performance. From this perspective,
legitimacy judgments are not so much active assessments of the congruence between organisational
features and underlying norms in a single organisation based on externally provided ‘information’,
but involve an assessment of congruence between the organisation in question and a mentally stored
representation, or schema, of an IO. As Stefan Goetze and Berthold Rittberger reason, ‘From
a cognitive perspective, the legitimacy of social objects and practices can be conceived of as
corresponding to a state of congruence between the schemas governing a particular situation and the
(perception of the) object or practice.’44 Judgments about the legitimacy of an IO involve using
schemata, based on prior experiences and mental models, to process different strands of information
to make an inference about the right of that IO to rule.
Whereas research on schemata is mainly (though not exclusively) concerned with how the way we
organise information and knowledge affects how we process information, the cognitive literature has
also contributed to our understanding of how speciﬁc processing rules, known as heuristics, inﬂuence
inferential judgment and decision-making.45 Cognitive heuristics are ‘shortcuts that reduce complex
problem solving to simpler judgmental operations’.46 The ﬁeld of heuristics is buttressed by large
amounts of empirical, experiment-based research, whose central ﬁnding is that actors not only rely
on speciﬁc cognitive tools to reach judgments, but that using such tools tends to bias judgments in
identiﬁable and systematic ways. Many heuristics have been discovered, but among the most studied
are the representativeness heuristic (making judgments based on similarity to the prototypes one has
in mind), the availability heuristic (making judgments based on the information that is most
bounded rationality’, American Psychologist, 58:9 (2003), pp. 697–720 (pp. 697, 720); Fiske and Taylor,
Social Cognition.
40 Fiske, ‘Schema-based versus piecemeal politics’, p. 42.
41 Paul DiMaggio, ‘Culture and cognition’, Annual Review of Sociology, 23 (1997), pp. 263–87 (p. 269); Casson,
‘Schemata in cognitive anthropology’, p. 430; D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology, p. 136.
42 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 36; see also Thomas Gilovitch, ‘Seeing the past in the present: the effect of
associations to familiar events on judgments and decisions’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40:5
(1981), pp. 797–808; Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes, p. 24.
43 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 28.
44 Stefan Goetze and Berthold Rittberger, ‘A matter of habit? The sociological foundations of empowering the
European Parliament’, Comparative European Politics, 8:1 (2010), pp. 37–54 (p. 40).
45 See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’, Science,
185:4157 (1974), pp. 1124–31. For an overview, see David Dunning, ‘Judgment and decision making’, in Susan Fiske
and Neil Macrae (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Social Cognition (Los Angeles; London: Sage, 2012), pp. 251–72.
46 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, p. 178.
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memorable or familiar), and the anchoring heuristic (using the earliest information and experiences
as a baseline for subsequent judgments). As we will discuss next, the use of these heuristics
depends on comparative judgments and generally leads to the conﬁrmation of prior beliefs
rather than updating. As Paul DiMaggio emphasises, cognitive tools ‘promote efﬁciency at
the expense of synoptic accuracy’.47 In other words, ‘the price of cognitive economy in world
politics is – as in other domains of life – susceptibility to error and bias’.48 We should expect, then,
legitimacy judgments to display biases that make them deviate systematically from the ‘objective’ or
face value congruence between underlying norms and organisational features, which much existing
research assumes.
Legitimacy judgments are comparative
Standard accounts of legitimacy implicitly expect actors to assess legitimacy against an ideal refer-
ence point; that is, does this IO conform to our normative standards of rightful rule? A cognitive
approach, in contrast, expects legitimacy judgments to be based on a reference point that is available
in the environment. Judgments are formed not on the basis of the optimal level of congruence
between organisational features and norms, but rather on the degree of consistency with known
models. Thus, whether a speciﬁc IO is more or less legitimate than another relevant IO is expected to
be more informative of legitimacy judgments than comparison to an abstract ideal.
The comparative nature of legitimacy judgments is rooted in what Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman have called the representativeness heuristic.49 People make sense of new information by
evaluating it in relation to existing cognitive schemata, which tend to take the form of prototypes or
exemplars. ‘Matching each new instance with instances stored in memory is then a major way
human beings comprehend the world.’50 We can expect beliefs about an IO’s right to rule to be
formed on the basis of ‘departures’ in legitimacy from the legitimacy of a (ideal or real) reference
organisation.51 This argument is rooted in the experimentally veriﬁed idea that changes and dif-
ferences are more accessible than absolute values. In Kahneman’s own words, ‘Perceptions are
reference dependent: The perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reﬂect the contrast between the
stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli.’52
Cognitive psychologists debate whether such comparisons are based on prototypes, understood as an
ideal-typical representation of an object, or exemplars, understood as a collection of existing models
that have previously been encountered by an observer.53 In any case, what matters for our purposes is
that people judge the legitimacy of an IO in relation to a reference category. Prototypes and exemplars
are chosen based both on being ‘highly accessible’,54 that is, readily available to memory, and
47 DiMaggio, ‘Culture and cognition’, p. 269.
48 Philip Tetlock, ‘Social psychology and world politics’, in Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey
(eds), The Handbook of Social Psychology (4th edn, New York: McGraw Hill, 1998), pp. 868–912 (p. 877).
49 Tversky and Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty’; see also Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On analogical reasoning’,
Harvard Law Review, 106:3 (1993), pp. 741–91.
50 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 13.
51 For the role of institutional referents in processes of international institutional change, see Tobias Lenz and
Alexandr Burilkov, ‘Institutional pioneers in world politics: Regional institution building and the inﬂuence of
the European Union’, European Journal of International Relations, online ﬁrst, available at: doi: 10.1177/
1354066116674261 (2016).
52 Kahneman, ‘A perspective on judgment and choice’, p. 703.
53 See Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, pp. 106–14.
54 Kahneman, ‘A perspective on judgment and choice’, p. 700.
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displaying superﬁcial categorical similarities with the IO under judgment.55 Similarity is generally
assessed on the basis of semantic or relational similarities not necessarily relevant to the judgment at
hand.56 This might well explain the curious absence of parliamentary bodies in global organisations
but also their pervasive existence in regional organisations. The European Union might be the pro-
totypical exemplar of a regional organisation, and the fact that it features a parliamentary body might
have come to pose a legitimacy challenge to regional organisations that do not have one. In contrast,
the United Nations might be the prototype of global organisations, and the fact that it does not have a
parliamentary body implies that the absence of parliamentary bodies in other global organisations has
not induced similar legitimacy challenges. This kind of comparison has the potential to introduce bias
because how similar one IO is to an important reference organisation may not be a good predictor of
how congruent a speciﬁc IO’s procedures or performance are with underlying norms.
The comparative nature of legitimacy judgments implies that perceptions of legitimacy are not IO-
speciﬁc and independent but are likely to co-vary across the institutional environment. This
addresses two weaknesses of the existing congruence model. The ﬁrst one is that it has difﬁculty
accounting for spatial dynamics. A cognitive approach provides a plausible account of the inter-
dependent nature of legitimacy judgments. One implication, for instance, is that when legitimacy
judgments around the exemplar organisation change, then so too will judgments about other related
IOs. This helps to explain why legitimacy crises often affect a range of organisations, even if the
procedures, purpose, and performance of some remain unchanged. Second, this lesson also adds
determinacy to the institutional changes that are likely to result from legitimacy dynamics. Whereas
the requirement of congruence in the standard model does not ‘dictate’ speciﬁc institutional reforms
in response to legitimacy loss, the cognitive model suggests that they will likely aim to mirror features
in the exemplar IO. Conversely, conformity to typical IOs can help explain the persistence of
legitimacy perceptions even if there is a growing incongruence between underlying norms and
organisational features over time.
More broadly, comparative legitimacy grounds the general expectation that judgments of IO
legitimacy within an organisational ﬁeld display less variation, or more similarity, than an assess-
ment of an individual IO’s congruence between underlying values and organisational features alone
would lead us to expect. The standard congruence model should expect legitimacy judgments to vary
rather widely across different IOs, reﬂecting speciﬁc ‘local’ conditions. However, if we conceive
legitimacy judgments across a set of diverse IOs as interrelated, based on a limited set of prototypical
exemplars, the full range of these judgments is likely to be narrower, ﬂuctuating around the legiti-
macy of the reference IOs. In sum, the standard congruence model and the cognitive congruence
model of legitimacy differ in the range of variation in legitimacy perceptions that they predict.
Legitimacy judgments are robust, up to a threshold
Standard accounts of how actors make judgments expect updating of prior beliefs in response to new
information – regardless of whether those beliefs are normative or instrumental in nature. This is the
baseline assumption of both Bayesian theories of inference as well as (fully) rational actor models.
For legitimacy, this implies that actors are constantly monitoring the degree of congruence between
underlying norms and an IO’s procedures, purpose, and performance. But experiments have shown
55 See Elenor Rosch, ‘Principles of categorization’, in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts: Core
Readings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 27–48.
56 Dredre Gentner and Arthur B. Markman, ‘Structure mapping in analogy and similarity’, American Psycho-
logist, 52:1 (1997), pp. 45–56. See also Gilovitch, ‘Seeing the past in the present’.
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that actors display a more conservative process of judgment formation, and that revision is slower
and less responsive to changes. This empirical ﬁnding is explained in part by the types of heuristics
actors use to make sense of information and experiences. Anchoring is one such heuristic that refers
to actors’ tendency to give disproportionately more weight to prior beliefs, for example by making
them a reference point of comparison, and less weight to new information. To the extent that new
information is considered at all, it tends to be assimilated to ﬁt existing beliefs.57 People tend to be
more sensitive to information that conﬁrms existing schemata and tend to neglect, or easily discard,
disconﬁrming information.58 In this sense, the formation of judgment is theory- or belief- rather than
data-driven.59 The anchoring heuristic leads to a general tendency for selective attention to infor-
mation and for actors to see what they expect to see based on prior beliefs and worldviews. In an
empirical application of this idea, Robert Jervis shows that the failure to rethink and adjust pre-
existing beliefs to incoming information is at the root of intelligence failure.60 A core implication of
cognitive models of perception, then, is that judgments are ‘sticky’ because early judgments tend to
get reinforced and that updating based on new information is slow and unreliable.61 As Richard
Herrmann notes, ‘cognitive theories … typically feature continuity’.62
Accordingly, we should expect perceptions of organisational legitimacy to be: (1) strongly condi-
tioned by prior judgments about the IO; (2) resistant to updating; and therefore (3) also self-
reinforcing. Existing beliefs about certain organisations in the environment will serve as the anchor
that forms the baseline for whether an IO is more or less legitimate. The ‘stickiness’ of legitimacy
judgments implies that incongruence between institutional features and underlying societal norms
may persist over extended periods of time without a decline in legitimacy. Judgments of legitimacy
are likely to display less frequent change, or updating, than an assessment of organisational con-
gruence would lead us to expect. In other words, the standard model and the cognitive model of
legitimacy differ in their predictions of frequency of change in legitimacy.
Although the cognitive approach implies a bias toward persistence and replication, it certainly does
not conclude that beliefs and perceptions never change. In fact, the cognitive approach tells us
something about the conditions under which we are likely to observe changes in perceptions of
legitimacy and how these changes are likely to unfold. Gradual and isolated revelations of dis-
crepancies between organisational features and underlying norms are likely to be integrated into and
‘rationalised’ by existing schemata, therefore slowing updating and forestalling an erosion of
legitimacy.63 However, a change in sticky legitimacy judgments becomes possible when actors are
confronted with new, strong, salient, and rapidly arriving information that is disruptive of existing
judgments and difﬁcult to accommodate in existing schemata.64 When new information triggers
57 George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy; Tetlock, ‘Social psychology and world politics’.
58 Richard K. Herrmann, ‘Perceptions and image theory in International Relations’, in Huddy, Sears, and Levy
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, pp. 334–363 (p. 343).
59 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, pp. 104–5.
60 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca;
New York: Cornell University Press, 2010).
61 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London; New York: Penguin Books, 2011).
62 Herrmann, ‘Perceptions and image theory in International Relations’, p. 348.
63 Over the long term, however, this may make legitimacy beliefs less robust and more vulnerable to external
shocks or internal contestation, which is itself an important endogenous change in legitimacy beliefs that is
unrelated to the degree of congruence. See Rixen and Viola, ‘Historical institutionalism and International
Relations’, pp. 19–20.
64 DiMaggio, ‘Culture and cognition’, p. 272. See also Levy, ‘Psychology and foreign policy decision-making’.
Tobias Lenz and Lora Anne Viola
952
strong negative emotions or creates discomﬁting feelings of cognitive inconsistency, actors are
prompted to revisit their judgments in a more active and analytical fashion. Recent research in
cognitive psychology argues that while reliance on heuristics or ‘quasi-rationality’ is the most
common mode of cognitive processing, actors do have multiple cognitive approaches available to
them depending on context. Kenneth Hammond’s cognitive continuum theory, for example, arrays
different modes of cognitive processing along a continuum from intuition to rational analysis, with
quasi-rationality positioned somewhere in between.65 Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor similarly argue
that actors are not just cognitive misers but ‘motivated tacticians’ that can be motivated by new
information to be more reﬂexive and engaged thinkers.66 As a result, we should expect different –
that is, more or less active – modes of cognitive processing to lead to different judgments; while
heuristics lead to biases that may mask or make tolerable incongruence, more reﬂexive reasoning
may increase actor sensitivity to incongruence.
According to cognition theory, movement towards more reﬂective modes of reasoning is stimulated
through disruptive information that triggers negative emotions and cognitive conﬂict. Being con-
fronted with an urgent crisis or starkly conﬂictual information, for example, can lead actors to
engage in more active reﬂection. The idea here, following cognitive-consistency principles, is that
change in deeply held perceptions is more likely when existing schemata are no longer serviceable
and there is no other easily available path for accounting for and resolving contradictory evidence.67
We would expect, for example, actors making legitimacy judgments about the IMF after the Asian
Financial Crisis to engage in more reﬂexive rather than routine cognition as compared to just before
the crisis, even though neither the IMF’s organisational features nor underlying values underwent
change. In this context, emotion often ‘assist[s] the process of reasoning’.68 Neuroscientiﬁc research
suggests that humans use emotion-based evaluations of threat and novelty to direct attention and
activate thinking, making reasoning and emotions intimately linked.69 Negative emotions, in par-
ticular, appear to be inﬂuential in triggering a revision of legitimacy judgments because, as Fiske and
Taylor explain, ‘negative affect is a bigger change from the baseline, more interrupting and dis-
tracting’.70 George Marcus, Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, summarising a large body of
cognitive literature, similarly suggest that habitual judgment that bolsters stability is sustained by
positive emotions, whereas active reasoning is sparked by negative emotions that cause despair and
anxiety, stimulating actors to collect more information, to actively assess prior judgments, and to
learn new attitudes and behaviours.71 Consequently, we especially expect negative emotions to lead
to a reassessment of IO legitimacy. Thus, when political activists manage to stir widespread anxiety
65 Kenneth Hammond, ‘The Integration of Research in Judgment and Decision Theory’, University of Colorado
Institute of Behavioral Science, Report No. 226 (1980).
66 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, pp. 15–16 and ch. 2. See also Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, who
distinguishes between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ thinking.
67 Philip Tetlock, ‘Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: In search of an elusive concept’, in George W.
Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds), Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1991),
pp. 20–61 (pp. 27–31); Tetlock, ‘Social psychology and world politics’; see also Fiske, ‘Schema-based versus
piecemeal politics’, pp. 50–1.
68 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (2nd edn, New York: Penguin,
2005), pp. x–xi.
69 George Marcus, Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000); Rose McDermott, ‘The feeling of rationality: the meaning of
neuroscientiﬁc advances for political science’, Perspectives on Politics, 2:4 (2004), pp. 691–706.
70 Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, p. 371.
71 Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment.
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about an IO, changes in legitimacy judgments should be more likely. The ‘Vote Leave’ campaign
prior to the Brexit referendum might be a good example of this dynamic.
Cognitive conﬂict and discomfort can also be expected when actors operate in an environment with
conﬂicting beliefs, or ‘multiple advocacy’, creating cognitive inconsistency that, in turn, promotes
active reﬂection on existing beliefs.72 Actors otherwise content to maintain pre-existing beliefs, may
be compelled to revisit them when (perhaps long-existing) mismatches between underlying standards
of appropriateness and organisational features become the subject of contestation. As Suchman
notes, ‘An organization may diverge dramatically from societal norms yet retain legitimacy because
the divergence goes unnoticed.’73 Once that divergence becomes a topic of political debate with
multiple, apparently irreconcilable, positions, actors will be more compelled to re-examine, and thus
more likely to revise, their perceptions. For example, highly technical issues such as global ﬁnancial
regulation or taxation regimes remained largely unpoliticised before the 2008 economic crisis,
allowing organisations in these areas to operate without experiencing low legitimacy perceptions
even though the level of incongruence between their institutional features (for example, lack of
transparency and representativeness) and underlying social norms (for example, equal representation
and democratic accountability) was, arguably, quite high.74 Thus, a given level of (in)congruence
might be assessed differently depending on the extent to which it becomes subject to political
debate.75
III. Testable propositions of the cognitive approach to legitimacy
What are the testable implications of the cognitive model of legitimacy? We argue that the way actors
cognitively process judgments about the match or mismatch between underlying norms and an IO’s
features generates patterns of legitimacy beliefs that are distinct from those predicted by the standard
congruence model. We develop these implications in the form of testable propositions that concern,
respectively, judgment formation (propositions 1 and 2), judgment change (propositions 3 and 4),
and IO responses (proposition 5). Before developing these propositions, we address how cognitive
models that work at the level of individual actors can be used to understand aggregate judgments.
Aggregation: From individual to collective judgment
A deﬁning characteristic of many cognitive schemata and patterns of individual judgment is that they
are supra-individual; that is, they are not idiosyncratic to particular individuals but are shared by
many. In this sense, cognition and perception are systematic, not idiosyncratic. Similar cognitive
processes, and resulting biases, are likely to characterise legitimacy judgments of diverse individuals.
Because of this, we can expect to ﬁnd systematic patterns in judgments of IO legitimacy.76
Conversely, patterns of organisational legitimacy, and legitimacy-driven institutional change,
are likely to reﬂect, at least partly, the aggregate biases of individual cognitive assessments.
72 George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy; Tetlock, ‘Social psychology and world politics’, p. 880.
73 Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy’, p. 574.
74 See, for example, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Xiaoke Zhang, ‘Setting the rules: Private power, political
underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and ﬁnancial governance’, International Affairs, 84:3
(2008), pp. 535–54.
75 Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International authority and its politicization’.
76 For a strategy to test psychological arguments of decision making that exploits this insight, see Chaim
Kaufmann, ‘Out of the lab and into the archives: a method for testing psychological explanations of political
decision making’, International Studies Quarterly, 38:4 (1994), pp. 557–86.
Tobias Lenz and Lora Anne Viola
954
These patterns, we suggest, differ systematically from those expected by the standard ‘objectivist’
congruence model of legitimacy.
Moreover, there is an important social element to cognitive schemata that undergird legitimacy
judgments. While schemata can range from the universal to the idiosyncratic, many schemata are
‘culturally shared mental constructs’.77 A cognitive approach to the study of IO legitimacy directs
our attention not to individual psychology but to ‘sociomental’78 phenomena that are shared by
many, if not most, individuals, and that affect their legitimacy judgments in similar ways. Processes
of social contagion and peer effects reinforce the collective nature of legitimacy judgments and can
trigger rapid, wave-like change.79 In the realm of IO legitimacy, ‘cognitive construction, in short, is
social construction’.80
Thus, legitimacy judgments of IOs are likely to display fairly coherent aggregate patterns not because
the assessment of congruence between organisational features and underlying norms is easy and
‘objective’, but because any actor’s assessment of congruence between an IO and a typical exemplar
is likely to be based on the same limited range of reference points. Categorisation theory shows that
some members of a category are more central than others.81 Even though no such research exists on
international organisations, it appears plausible to assume that a representative sample of politically
informed citizens around the world, when asked to give an example of a regional organisation,
would much more often mention the European Union than, say, the Southern African Customs
Union; similarly, it seems likely that the United Nations features as a prototype of a global orga-
nisation more often than, say, the International Whaling Commission. Overall, we argue that the
propositions we develop should apply generally to both individual actors and collective legitimacy
judgments.82
Propositions
Because legitimacy judgments rely on pre-existing beliefs that tend to get replicated and reinforced
over time (anchoring) and because of the importance of existing prototypes, we should expect
legitimacy judgments to be more favourable towards well-established, familiar, and known orga-
nisations. Even a new organisation that conforms to existing models is likely to have a lower, or
shallower, level of legitimacy than a well-established one. New organisations suffer from what
organisational theorists call the ‘liability of newness’,83 a condition that results from being unknown
77 D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology, p. 132, emphasis added.
78 Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes.
79 Todd Hall and Andrew Ross, ‘Affective politics after 9/11’, International Organization, 69:4 (2015), pp. 847–79
(p. 855).
80 Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, ‘Ethnicity as cognition’, Theory and Society, 33:1
(2004), pp. 31–64 (p. 52), emphasis in original.
81 Rosch, ‘Principles of categorization’.
82 It should be noted that we are agnostic about the relevant constituency whose legitimacy judgments matter
most for an IO. This, we believe, is largely an empirical question. Relevant challenges to IO legitimacy have
recently come from state governments (see, for example, rising powers in the United Nations), wider ‘expert’
constituencies (for example, non-governmental organisations in the case of the World Trade Organization) and
the population-at-large (as in the case of the European Union). It is a general presumption in the cognitive
literature that legitimacy judgments of diverse constituencies are likely to be subject to similar cognitive
processes, which we endorse as a parsimonious starting point that may be subject to reﬁnement later on.
83 Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy’, p. 586; John Freeman, Glenn Carroll, and Michael Hannan, ‘The liability of
newness: Age dependence in organizational death rates’, American Sociological Review, 48:5 (1983), pp. 692–710
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and, therefore, more difﬁcult to evaluate because the formation of judgments and inferences relies on
pre-existing beliefs and experiences that are unavailable.
Over time, the ‘liability of newness’ turns into a ‘legitimacy dividend’ that comes from the com-
prehensibility, familiarity, and reliability of beliefs formed over a long period. Continuity and
legitimacy thus become mutually reinforcing. Frequent and intense interaction can make perceptions
of legitimacy more robust over time. Longevity and familiarity are also likely to lower the threshold
of congruence, so that an organisation may continue to ‘make sense’ even if the degree of congruence
between its features and underlying norms begins to slip. Of course, even a long-lived and familiar
IO is more likely to suffer legitimacy losses if it is no longer congruent with underlying norms, but
age may compensate for such incongruence for extended periods of time.
The increasing difﬁculty of institutional change over time is also a key prediction of historical
institutionalism. Scholars in this theoretical tradition tend to stress the rising costs of change
as institutions create constituencies that have vested interests in maintaining the institutional
environment. High set-up and sunk costs as well as learning and coordination effects
lead to increasing returns to using the same institution.84 A cognitive approach emphasises the
stickiness of cognitive expectations once an institution has been put in place. In this vein, Amitav
Acharya shows how policymakers’ ‘cognitive priors’ mitigated pressures for institutional change in
Asian regional organisations for a long time, and eventually led to merely symbolic change that kept
intact these cognitive priors.85 The cognitive approach to legitimacy, then, leads to the following
proposition:
P1 Longevity: a) Established IOs will enjoy a ‘legitimacy dividend’ and are likely to be
perceived as more legitimate than new ones. b) As a result, institutional change to enhance
congruence should become more difﬁcult the older and more established an organisation is.
The next two propositions follow from the insight that legitimacy judgments are comparative. First,
the representativeness and accessibility heuristics expect perceptions of legitimacy to be affected by
the extent of an IO’s conformity to existing organisational prototypes and the ease of extrapolating
from speciﬁc organisational experiences. Given the indeterminacy of the link between underlying
standards of appropriateness and organisational features, actors are more likely to assess an orga-
nisation as legitimate when it conforms to other exemplars of organisations in the environment. As
Michael Hannan and John Freeman have noted, ‘the simple prevalence of a form tends to give it
legitimacy’.86 This bias towards standardisation or conformity reﬂects actors’ conservatism and
preference for continuity and familiarity. IOs can ‘protect their cognitive legitimacy by conforming
to prevailing “heuristics”’.87 Even though there are different ways to translate the principle of
democracy into speciﬁc institutional features in nation states, there is a surprising degree of
(p. 692); Arthur Stinchcombe, ‘Social structure and organizations’, in James G. March (ed.), Handbook of
Organizations (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965), pp. 142–193 (p. 148).
84 Brian W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1994); Thomas Rixen and Lora Anne Viola, ‘Putting path dependence in its place: Toward a
typology of institutional change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 27:2 (2015), pp. 301–23.
85 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2009).
86 Michael Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989),
p. 132. See also John Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and
ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, 83:2 (1977), pp. 340–63.
87 Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy’, p. 589.
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institutional commonality among democratic states around the world. Similarly, at the international
level, some authors have argued that the empowerment of the European Parliament has become the
‘habitual’ response to allegations of a democratic deﬁcit in the European Union over time. Whereas
initially different institutional options were carefully considered in the face of a legitimacy challenge,
over time strengthening the European Parliament became the default response.88 Now there is
evidence to suggest that the creation of parliamentary assemblies is becoming the ‘standard’ response
to allegations of a democratic deﬁcit in other regional organisations as well.89 Similarly, recent
ﬁndings suggest that there is a signiﬁcant degree of convergence in the way that IOs open up to non-
state actors, suggesting that institutional templates play an important role in how IOs confront
legitimacy challenges.90 These considerations lead to our second proposition:
P2 Conformity: a) An IO that conforms to existing organisational prototypes is more likely to
be perceived as legitimate than one that does not. b) As a result, legitimacy crises are likely to
lead to the adoption of ‘familiar’ institutional designs.
Further, given both that legitimacy judgments are comparative and that legitimate organisations tend to be
isomorphic (P2 conformity), we expect both positive and negative legitimacy perceptions of referent, or
focal, IOs to affect the legitimacy perceptions of related organisations in the environment. This is perhaps
most apparent for legitimacy crises. A legitimacy crisis occurs ‘when the level of social recognition that its
identity, interests, practices, norms, or procedures are rightful declines to the point where the actor or
institution must either adapt (by reconstituting the social bases of its legitimacy, or by investing more
heavily in material practices of coercion or bribery) or face disempowerment’.91 Such crises of legitimacy
often are not restricted to a single IO, but are likely to be contagious across a set of organisations. The
comparative nature of legitimacy means that an actor’s perception of organisational legitimacy is generally
likely to decline when the referent IO has slipped into crisis. We might expect, for example, that many
regional organisations around the world will have trouble retaining previous legitimacy levels in view of
the apparent legitimacy crisis currently affecting the European Union. Similarly, a legitimacy crisis of the
United Nations Security Council is likely to affect perceptions of other United Nations organisational
emanations. Global economic organisations, as noted above, have been susceptible to contagious legiti-
macy loss, even if the crisis was localised to one IO, such as the IMF in the Asian Financial Crisis. At the
same time, organisations that are perceived as legitimate can lend that legitimacy to other organisations,
resulting in a wave of positive legitimacy.92 Thus, our third proposition says:
P3 Contagion: a) A change in the legitimacy of an important referent IO in an organisational
ﬁeld will affect the legitimacy of other organisations in the ﬁeld. b) As a result, we are likely to
see waves of legitimacy-driven institutional change.
Despite the cognitive approach’s emphasis on the stickiness of perceptions, it also helps us to think about
the conditions under which we are likely to see a change in legitimacy judgments and, conversely, what
conditions can promote stable legitimacy beliefs even in the face of some degree of ‘objective’
88 Goetze and Rittberger, ‘A matter of habit?’.
89 Rocabert et al., ‘The Rise of International Parliamentary Institutions’.
90 Thomas Sommerer and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Diffusion Across International Organizations: The Global Spread of
Participatory Governance’ (Manuscript, University of Stockholm, 2014). See also Francesco Duina and Tobias
Lenz, ‘Regionalism and diffusion revisited: From ﬁnal design towards stages of decision-making’, Review of
International Studies, 42:4 (2016), pp. 773–97.
91 Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, p. 158.
92 On legitimacy borrowing, see Eric Shaunn Mattingly and Jonathan H. Westover, ‘Enacting change through
borrowed legitimacy: an institutional perspective’, International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 23:4
(2005), pp. 637–51.
Legitimacy and institutional change in international organisations
957
incongruence. Research on cognition has shown that beliefs are most susceptible to revision and updating
when information deviating from prior beliefs is strong, salient, and arrives rapidly.93 For similar reasons,
levels of active reﬂection may be related to the policy-cycle, with founding moments or moments requiring
active decision-making eliciting more debate and active thinking. Hurd, for example, highlights the strong
consequences deliberation at the 1945 San Francisco Conference had for establishing UN legitimacy.94
More generally, our discussion thus far leads us to hypothesise that active reﬂection should be more
likely under conditions of contestation over an IO. Contestation can arise when an organisation loses
(or has no) taken-for-grantedness; that is, when new information elicits strong negative emotions or
creates new tasks or creates cognitive inconsistency that needs to be resolved.95 These are situations
in which the ‘failure’ of existing beliefs is exposed and requires resolution. During moments of
politicisation and contestation, actors otherwise content to maintain pre-existing beliefs and to not
actively deliberate over judgments may be compelled to revisit their beliefs in light of conﬂicting
beliefs or multiple advocacy.96 Contestation may be motivated by incongruence, but it need not be.
Incongruence between norms and organisational features can exist for extended periods of time
before becoming subject to political debate; thus, we expect politicisation to have an impact on
legitimacy independently of levels of incongruence.
Consider, for example, that for the ﬁrst 25 years of its history, the European Community’s legitimacy
was based on a permissive consensus that allowed elites to advance European integration without much
public scrutiny. With the Maastricht Treaty, this permissive consensus gave way to the politicisation of
the European Union and public political contestation over its legitimacy.97 Even though the incongruence
between underlying values and organisational features has remained constant or even improved due to
subsequent reforms aimed at addressing legitimacy deﬁcits, popular judgment of the EU’s legitimacy has
deteriorated.98 The implication is that a given degree of incongruence might be perceived as either
legitimate or illegitimate depending on the level of contestation within the relevant constituency, which
itself might change over time or over different phases in the policy cycle, yielding proposition four:
P4 Politicisation: a) Contestation can prompt active judgment updating. b) As a result, judgments
about legitimacy are more likely to change when an organisation is highly politicised.
Finally, understanding when legitimacy judgments are likely to change yields expectations about
the strategies that IOs and their leaders are likely to pursue to forestall or mitigate legitimacy losses.
The literature has focused thus far on institutional solutions to incongruence: institutional reforms
aimed at realigning organisational features and socially-held values. But the cognitive model
93 Peter M. Gollwitzer, ‘Mindset theory of action phases’, in Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanksi, and
E. Tory Higgins (eds), Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology (London: Sage, 2011); Johnson and
Tierney, ‘The Rubicon theory of war’.
94 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
95 Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International authority and its politicization’; Michael Zürn, ‘The
politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions’, European Political Science Review, 6:1
(2012), pp. 47–71.
96 George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy; Tetlock, ‘Social psychology and world politics’, p. 880.
97 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive con-
sensus to constraining dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science, 39:1 (2009), pp. 1–23.
98 Pieter de Wilde and Michael Zürn, ‘Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 50:1 (2012), pp. 137–53; Sara Hobolt and James Tilley, Blaming Europe?
Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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highlights that an IO should also be aware of how actors perceive it and on what basis those
perceptions are likely to rest. When an IO cannot maintain or repair its legitimacy by actively
bringing its procedures, purposes, and performance into alignment with norms and expectations,
an IO can attempt to inﬂuence how actors perceive it by presenting arguments, or legitimation
narratives,99 that (1) cash in on the longevity dividend; that (2) emphasise the prototypical nature of
the organisation (for example, we have all the features you expect us to have); that (3) emphasise the
conformity to other speciﬁc organisations that do not suffer from a legitimacy deﬁcit; and/or that 4)
emphasise those organisational features that are congruent with underlying norms while
downplaying the importance of those that are not. As Roy Suddaby and Royston Greenwood
note, ‘Rhetorical strategies are the deliberate use of persuasive language to legitimate or resist
an innovation by constructing congruence or incongruence among attributes of the innovation,
dominant institutional logics, and broader templates of institutional change.’100
The United Nations has engaged in several of these legitimation strategies. In the context of the
organisation’s 70th anniversary celebrations, for example, the United Nations launched an adver-
tising campaign called ‘70 Ways the UN Makes a Difference’.101 The campaign – rolled out under
the theme ‘Strong UN. Better World’ – aims to increase support for the organisation and its work by
drawing on its status as the premier IO. In a quote featured prominently on the United Nations’
website, then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reminds his audience that, ‘In many respects, the
world is shifting beneath our feet. Yet the Charter remains a ﬁrm foundation for shared progress.’102
This is an argument that directly appeals to the United Nations’ longevity and prototypical status
as sources of its legitimacy. Moreover, the United Nations’ marketing campaign emphasises its
mission – rather than its procedures or actual effectiveness – of improving life for all people globally,
thus underscoring the congruence between its purpose and underlying social norms. Indeed, distinct
organisational features can align differently with underlying norms, providing an opportunity for
legitimacy arbitrage. Procedural legitimacy, for example, might be perceived as worse when
compared to the purpose or performance of an organisation.103 Variation in congruence across
features provides IOs with an opportunity to pursue legitimation narratives that strategically seek
to shift stakeholder attention to the more congruent dimension.104 The purpose of strategic legit-
imation narratives is to prevent ‘objective’ incongruences from resulting in legitimacy loss
by engaging with heuristics that are likely to enhance tolerance for or mitigate uneasiness with
incongruence. These considerations yield our ﬁfth proposition:
P5 Legitimation Narratives: a) IOs are likely to pursue legitimation narratives that invoke
heuristic devices to promote cognitive consistency. b) As a result, even IOs with limited
‘objective’ legitimacy might survive over extended periods of time.
99 On legitimation practices in IOs generally, see Dominik Zaum, ‘International organisations, legitimacy, and
legitimation’, in Zaum (ed.), Legitimating International Organizations; Jennifer Gronau and Henning
Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics: International institutions’ legitimation strategies’,
Review of International Studies, 42:3 (2016), pp. 535–57.
100 Roy Suddaby and Royston Greenwood, ‘Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy’, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 50:1 (2005), pp. 35–67 (p. 41).
101 Available at: {http://www.un.org/un70/en/content/70ways} accessed 22 April 2017.
102 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, remarks at the General Assembly debate on the maintenance of international
peace and security, 1 October 2015. Available at: {http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52090#.
VzxCg46KMfM} accessed 22 April 2017.
103 In fact, there might even be trade-offs between dimensions. Robert Dahl, ‘A democratic dilemma: System
effectiveness versus citizen participation’, Political Science Quarterly, 109:1 (1994), pp. 23–34.
104 See Gronau and Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics’, pp. 7–8.
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These ﬁve propositions outline the expectations that a cognitive approach generates for the condi-
tions under which legitimacy judgments are likely to change, when they are likely to lead to insti-
tutional change, and what strategies we can expect organisations to pursue in response. We base
them on the conceptual model we generated from cognitive insights into perception and decision-
making. Although the propositions outline plausible patterns that can help us make sense of
legitimacy judgments, we leave an empirical test of the propositions (and a discussion of related
methodological challenges) for future work.
Conclusions
An increasing number of studies focus on empirically measuring the sources of legitimacy and the
degree to which relevant stakeholders actually perceive an IO as legitimate. But relatively little
attention has been paid to the mechanisms by which legitimacy judgments originate and change.
Standard accounts of legitimacy are based on an implicit model that sees legitimacy as the result of
congruence between institutional features (such as procedures, purpose, and performance) and
societally held norms. However, as we have outlined, this model cannot account for some likely
patterns of variation in legitimacy and institutional change. We argue that thinking about the role of
cognitive factors in the formation of legitimacy judgments can make an important contribution to
understanding the dynamics of legitimacy.
First, considering the cognitive factors involved in perceptions of legitimacy can help us to under-
stand how legitimacy judgments are formed and under which conditions they are likely to change.
This, in turn, gives us better leverage in explaining the set of cases in which organisational
features and societal norms remain constant but legitimacy perceptions change, and cases in which
organisational features and societal norms are incongruent but legitimacy perceptions remain
unchanged. Second, these insights help us to understand when legitimacy is likely to lead
to institutional change. Pressures for institutional change do not simply arise when there is an
‘objective’ incongruence between an IO’s features and socially-held norms. Instead, pressures for
institutional change will depend on the strength of heuristic biases, the legitimacy perceptions of
other IOs in the environment, and the ability of an IO to create a legitimation narrative that mitigates
the cognitive dissonance that arises from perceiving an ‘objectively’ illegitimate (that is, incongruent)
IO as legitimate.
Finally, considering the cognitive processes involved in legitimacy judgments has important practical
applications. In particular, it reveals the possibility of manipulating perceptions in order to shape
legitimacy judgments and indicates what types of legitimation strategies are likely to be successful
(namely, those that rely on anchoring, availability, and representativeness). Legitimation strategies, as
with all signalling strategies, need to speak to the psychology of perception. This is an important insight
given that many observers diagnose a widespread delegitimation of international authority.105 As the
success of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump indicate, countering perceptions of illegitimacy
simply with an appeal to ‘true facts’ alone is insufﬁcient. ‘Facts’ neither speak for themselves nor do they
motivate the updating of beliefs as long as they can be comfortably integrated into existing schemata,
meaning they do not cause cognitive dissonance or negative emotions. Countering the current legitimacy
crisis of global governance, therefore, will require taking into account the psychology of judgment, the
cognitive nature of decision-making, and the role of emotions in processing information.
105 See, for example, Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks, ‘The Delegitimation of International
Authority’ (unpublished manuscript).
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